Introduction

Originally published in 2018, How Democracies Die by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt quickly became one of the most influential works in the contemporary debate on the crisis of liberal democracies. In an international context marked by the rise of populist leaders, increasing political polarization, and growing distrust of representative institutions, the book offers a provocative interpretation of the processes through which democratic regimes can enter a trajectory of institutional deterioration. Unlike the classic image of democratic collapse — often associated with military coups or abrupt ruptures of the constitutional order — the authors argue that, in the contemporary world, democracies tend to weaken gradually, through internal processes of erosion of the institutions and political norms that sustain the regime.

Using a comparative approach that combines historical analysis and theoretical reflection, Levitsky and Ziblatt investigate emblematic episodes of democratic deterioration that occurred throughout the 20th century and draw parallels with recent political processes observed in different countries. By examining cases such as the rise of authoritarian regimes in interwar Europe and comparing them with contemporary transformations of democratic politics, the authors seek to identify recurring patterns in the trajectory of democracies that enter a process of institutional weakening. In this analytical journey, the work emphasizes the role played by elected political actors who, upon coming to power through legitimate institutional channels, gradually begin to weaken control mechanisms and strain fundamental democratic norms.

One of the central aspects of the authors' argument is the distinction between formal institutions and informal norms that structure the functioning of democracies. Although constitutions, electoral systems, and separation of powers mechanisms constitute the legal basis of the democratic regime, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue that the stability of these institutions also depends on political practices based on recognizing the legitimacy of adversaries and moderation in the exercise of power. The erosion of these norms — particularly mutual tolerance among political competitors and institutional forbearance — appears, in the authors' analysis, as one of the most evident signs of democratic fragility.

In this sense, How Democracies Die is part of a broad field of debates in contemporary political science that seeks to understand the recent transformations of representative democracies. Alongside other studies dedicated to the phenomenon of democratic erosion, the work helps shift the analysis of institutional collapse toward more subtle and gradual processes of political deterioration, in which the formal appearance of democracy can be preserved even when its effective functioning is compromised.

Given the relevance of these issues to contemporary political debate, this review aims to critically examine the main arguments developed by Levitsky and Ziblatt throughout the work. To this end, it seeks to present a systematic analysis of the book's chapters, highlighting its central concepts, its contributions to the debate on the crisis of democracies, and also some of its interpretative limitations. By revisiting the main elements of the authors' argumentation, the goal is to offer the reader a critical assessment of the work's analytical scope and its importance for understanding the challenges faced by democracies at the beginning of the 21st century.

How Democracies Die

The first chapter of How Democracies Die establishes the analytical starting point of the work by questioning a common perception in the political history of the 20th century: the idea that democracies usually die through abrupt military coups or violent institutional ruptures. For Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, this interpretation corresponds only partially to historical reality. In several contemporary cases, democratic erosion does not occur through tanks in the streets or the immediate suspension of the constitutional order, but rather through gradual processes in which authoritarian leaders come to power through seemingly legitimate institutional channels.

In this context, the chapter supports a central thesis that runs through the entire work: democracy often weakens when traditional political elites open space for leaders with authoritarian leanings, believing that they can control or use them strategically. In other words, the destruction of democratic institutions rarely occurs without the collaboration — explicit or implicit — of political actors who are part of the democratic system itself. This perspective shifts the focus of democracy analysis to the role played by political parties and institutional elites. Instead of understanding democratic collapse exclusively as a result of revolutionary movements or military coups, Levitsky and Ziblatt emphasize the internal processes by which political systems allow the rise of leaders who subsequently subvert the rules of the democratic game.

To develop this argument, the authors draw on emblematic historical examples, particularly the rise of authoritarian regimes in interwar Europe. The most prominent case is Nazi Germany. Although the Nazi Party had achieved significant electoral growth in the early 1930s, Adolf Hitler did not come to power exclusively through direct electoral victory. His appointment as chancellor in January 1933 resulted from political negotiations conducted by German conservative elites, who believed they could use Hitler as an instrument to contain the rise of leftist forces.

This political calculation proved deeply mistaken. Once in power, Hitler quickly consolidated authoritarian mechanisms that would lead to the destruction of the democratic institutions of the Weimar Republic. The episode illustrates, according to Levitsky and Ziblatt, a recurring pattern in political history: traditional elites often believe that radical leaders can be domesticated within the institutional system, when in reality they end up contributing to their own marginalization.

A similar situation occurred in Italy with Benito Mussolini, whose rise to power was facilitated by the collaboration of conservative political elites and the perception that his movement could restore political order in the face of social instability and fear of socialist revolutions. Mussolini was initially incorporated into the Italian political system through parliamentary alliances and institutional compromises that sought to stabilize the country. However, these alliances ultimately allowed the consolidation of an authoritarian regime. By mobilizing these historical examples, Levitsky and Ziblatt demonstrate that authoritarian leaders rarely seize power alone. Instead, their rise often depends on strategic political alliances with sectors of the political establishment. These alliances are generally motivated by short-term electoral calculations or perceptions of political threat from other ideological groups.

At this point, the chapter introduces a fundamental reflection on the role of political parties in preserving democracy. According to the authors, parties have historically played the role of "gatekeepers of democracy," responsible for screening candidates and preventing anti‑democratic figures from occupying positions of power. This informal mechanism of institutional protection constitutes one of the main barriers against the rise of authoritarian regimes. The classical political science literature had already highlighted the importance of party elites for the functioning of representative democracy. Joseph Schumpeter, in his formulation of the competitive model of democracy, argued that democratic systems depend on organized competition among political elites structured in parties. In this context, institutional stability is directly associated with the willingness of these elites to respect procedural rules and to exclude actors who reject the fundamental principles of the democratic order.

Levitsky and Ziblatt revisit this perspective, but emphasize that this institutional mechanism can fail when political elites opt for strategic alliances with radical leaders. In times of political crisis or intense ideological polarization, traditional parties may see in these leaders an opportunity to strengthen their electoral position or neutralize political adversaries considered more dangerous. This dynamic reveals a fundamental paradox of modern democracies. At the same time that democratic systems presuppose open political competition, this openness can be exploited by actors who are not committed to preserving the rules of the democratic game.

The chapter also highlights that authoritarian leaders rarely initially present themselves as declared enemies of democracy. In many cases, they adopt ambiguous discourses that combine populist rhetoric, criticism of existing institutions, and promises of restoring political order. This type of discourse allows such leaders to obtain political legitimacy without fully revealing their authoritarian intentions. This phenomenon can be understood in light of classic debates in political theory about the limits of democratic tolerance. Karl Popper, in The Open Society and Its Enemies, formulated the so‑called "paradox of tolerance," according to which a completely tolerant society may end up allowing the rise of forces that will destroy tolerance itself. For Popper, the preservation of open societies requires that certain limits be established to prevent the rise of intolerant movements.

Although Levitsky and Ziblatt do not explicitly adopt Popper's philosophical argument, their analysis suggests a similar concern: democracies need to develop institutional mechanisms capable of identifying and containing leaders who show authoritarian leanings before they acquire significant political power.

Another important element discussed in the chapter is the relationship between political crises and the rise of authoritarian leadership. Moments of institutional instability, political polarization, or economic crisis often create favorable conditions for the emergence of leaders who promise to restore order and stability through radical solutions. This interpretation finds support in classic analyses of the rise of authoritarian regimes in the 20th century. Hannah Arendt, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, highlighted how contexts of social disintegration and institutional discredit can favor political movements that promise to radically reorganize the existing political order.

However, Levitsky and Ziblatt emphasize that political crises alone do not explain the collapse of democracies. The decisive factor lies in how political elites respond to these crises. When traditional parties refuse to collaborate with authoritarian leaders and maintain their commitment to democratic norms, political institutions can resist even in contexts of intense instability. On the other hand, when political elites opt for opportunistic alliances with radical leaders, the democratic system becomes significantly more vulnerable. In this sense, the chapter suggests that the survival of democracies depends less on their formal rules and more on the behavior of the political actors who operate within those rules.

This approach allows us to understand democracy not only as a set of legal institutions but as a political system sustained by informal norms, institutional practices, and shared commitments among political elites. At the end of the chapter, Levitsky and Ziblatt make it clear that political history repeatedly demonstrates the risks associated with the normalization of authoritarian leaders within the democratic system. When political parties abandon their role as institutional guardians and prioritize immediate electoral gains, the democratic system can become vulnerable to processes of gradual erosion. This interpretation offers a fundamental starting point for the following chapters of the work, in which the authors examine in more detail the institutional and normative mechanisms that allow the preservation — or deterioration — of contemporary democracies.